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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES LEADING TO THE DIMINISHING OF PRIVACY 
RIGHTS. 
by 
ANABELLE MARIA D’SOUZA 
(Under the Direction of Robert Brussack) 
ABSTRACT 
 The Purpose of my thesis is to bring about the awareness of the importance of 
Privacy in our lives. Privacy is an essential element of a free society without which 
individuals would lose the ability to interact with one another in private. With the 
advancement in police surveillance technology there is a clash between an individuals 
right to keep a secret and the State’s power to penetrate that secret. State of the art 
technologies such as the financial crimes enforcement network, wearable computing and 
surveillance cameras are some of the latest devices invading privacy. These technological 
advances have become so deep rooted that some of the privacy invasion predicted for the 
future are alarming. In order to curb privacy invasions we require stricter laws regulating 
the government’s power to interfere with our privacy rights. The shape of our future 
depends on how we deal with the present issues. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  Privacy is a fundamental human right, which is recognized under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and many other international and regional treaties.1 It embodies the values of human 
dignity, freedom of association and freedom of speech and has become one of the most 
important human rights issues of modern time.2 
 Privacy comes from the Latin word “to separate or deprive” referring to the 
distinction between what belongs to the individual rather than the State.3 Over the years 
there have been various definitions of the term “privacy”. 4 The array of definitions may 
be due to the variety of personal matters covered by them. 5 One scholar recognized 
privacy as a mechanism in three different ways, ‘privacy-as-seclusion,’ ‘privacy-as-
information-control’ and ‘privacy of autonomous personal life.’6 The term “privacy” can 
be described as a form of power, which is a powerful tool in the hands of each individual 
to protect himself against the world.7 We could ask ourselves the question - who is 
entitled to this power of privacy? I think every person in the world is entitled to the right 
                                                                 
1 David Banisar and Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of Data 
Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 1,1 (1999).  
2 Id.  
3 Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look At The Costs Of Privacy And The 
Benefits Of Information Exchange, 2000 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.2, 3 (2000). 
4 Carol M. Bast, What’s bugging you? Inconsistencies And Irrationalities Of The law Of Eavesdropping, 47 
DePaul L. Rev. 837, 881 (1998).   
5 Id. 
6William C. Hefferman, Privacy Rights, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 737, 746 (1995). Tort law is usually 
associated with protection for the first two mechanisms of privacy, while constitutional law is associated 
with protection for privacy of autonomous personal life. 
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of privacy, be it a person living on the streets or a millionaire living in a mansion. When 
an individual loses his privacy, he also loses the capacity to distinguish himself from the 
rest of the world; he will not be able to distinguish himself from others, to maintain an 
independent life and be a complete and autonomous person. 8 According to Ruth Gavison, 
privacy comprises of three elements: secrecy, anonymity and solitude.9 An individual 
loses his/her privacy “as others obtain information about the individual [loss of secrecy], 
pay attention to him [loss of anonymity], or gain access to him [loss of solitude].”10 
According to Roger Clark, “Privacy is the interest that individuals have in sustaining a 
'personal space', free from interference by other people and organizations.”11  
Drilling down into a deeper level, privacy has several dimensions:  
1. Privacy of the person - this is sometimes referred to as “bodily privacy”. It is 
concerned with the integrity of the individual's body. Issues include compulsory 
immunization, blood transfusion without consent, compulsory provision of samples of 
body fluids and body tissue and compulsory sterilization;  
2. Privacy of personal behavior - This relates to all aspects of behavior, but especially to 
sensitive matters, such as sexual preferences and habits, political activities and religious 
practices, both in private and in public places. It includes what is sometimes referred to as 
“media privacy”;  
3. Privacy of personal communications - Individuals claim an interest in being able to 
communicate among them, using various media, without routine monitoring of their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key, Cryptography, The Clipper Chip, And the Constitution, 143 
U. pa. L. Rev. 709, 712 (1995). 
8 Id.  
9 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 433 (1980). 
10 Id at 428. 
11 Roger Clark, Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of Terms, available 
at  http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html. 
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communications by other persons or organizations. This includes what is sometimes 
referred to as “interception privacy” and;  
4. Privacy of personal data - Individuals claim that data about themselves should not be 
automatically available to other individuals and organizations, and that, even where data 
is possessed by another party, the individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree 
of control over that data and its use. This is sometimes referred to as “data privacy” and 
“information privacy”.12 
 Privacy is very important today. Ruth Gavison viewed privacy as a concept 
pertaining to the individual.13 Privacy embodies the values of a healthy, liberal, 
democratic, and pluralistic society; individual autonomy; mental health; creativity; and 
the capacity to form and maintain meaningful relations with others.14 It provides an 
individual with the room to grow, a safety valve and respect.15 An individual can grow in 
a way that he or she has the ability to develop new ideas, contemplate past experiences 
and mature.16 The loss of privacy may be voluntary or involuntary. 17 The loss is 
voluntary when the individual freely gives up information, anonymity, or solitude.18 The 
loss is involuntary when privacy is invaded without the individual’s consent.19 Here the 
privacy loss is not the responsibility of the individual.20  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 Id. 
13 See supra note 4 at 885. 
14 Id. 
15 Id at 886. 
16 Id. 
17 Id at 888. 
18 Id at 889. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. The case of Commonwealth v. Louden illustrates the voluntary loss of privacy occasioned by an 
individual speaking loudly so that a third party could overhear the conversation without any electronic 
interception device. In this case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “once the conversation, threats 
and arguments between the Loudens and the screams of the children became audible to the neighbors, 
 4 
Historically in the United States, the formal recognition of privacy was given in Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s article ‘The Right to Privacy’,21 in which the authors 
defined privacy as ‘The right to be let alone.’22 Warren and Brandeis’s article on privacy 
was considered the “most influential law review article of all.”23 Although the law did 
provide some protection for privacy before Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous 
article, the protection consisted of limited legal theories whose shortcomings outweighed 
their usefulness.24 Rather than protecting individuals through legal doctrine specifically 
designed to safeguard their privacy interests, nineteenth century American courts and 
legislatures provided remedies for only a limited number of intrusions and left individuals 
with incomplete and inadequate protection. 25 The Fourth Amendment of the American 
Constitution provided for this remedy. 26 The government honored the notion that “a 
man’s house is his castle” and in 1791 added the Fourth Amendment to preserve "The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."27 But the Fourth 
Amendment had its limitations; it only prevented government officials from unlawfully 
intruding into the home or personal property, leaving private citizens free to invade the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
through a dividing wall in their home, the Loudens lost whatever expectation of privacy of privacy they had 
that their secret discussions and conversations would not be overheard.” 638 A. 2d 953, 959 (Pa 1994).   
21 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). 
22 Id at 195. 
23 Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth Of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
703, 703 (1990).  
24 Id at 705. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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privacy of life at will.28 In order to remedy those invasions committed by private citizens, 
the best relief that the courts in the nineteenth century could offer was an action for 
trespass.29 But in order to invoke this remedy, the plaintiff had to prove a physical 
intrusion upon their real property and this severely limited the remedy’s usefulness.30  
  In order to rectify the lack of effective legal remedies, the courts occasionally 
tried to compensate plaintiffs by taking existing legal doctrine to extremes as seen in the 
case of Moore v. New York Elevated R.R. Co.31 In this case the plaintiff who was a life-
tenant of a house brought an action to recover damages alleged to have been suffered by 
her when the defendant railroad company erected a railroad that overlooked her house.32 
The defendants were held responsible for the loss of privacy suffered by the plaintiff, and 
the jury found that the passengers and employees interfered with the privacy of the rooms 
of the plaintiff’s house by looking in when standing on the station platform or when 
coming down the stairs along the building. 33 But the court proceeded on a trespass theory 
of recovery, and it did not address the damages for the emotional distress occasioned by 
the loss of privacy. Thus the plaintiff was not fully compensated for privacy invasion. 34 
 The lack of legal redress and the increase in the number of privacy invasions over 
the years led to demands for improved remedies.35 During the nineteenth century there 
was a common occurrence of journalistic invasions of the privacy of public figures.36 In 
                                                                 
28 Kramer, supra note 23 at 705. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892). 
32 Id at 526. 
33 Id at 528. 
34 Kramer, supra note 23 at 707. 
35 Id at 708. 
36 Christopher S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. Cal. 
Interdisciplinary L.J. 295, 312 (1999). With the advent of quick photography and mass-circulation 
newspapers, the latter part of the century saw the first invasion of privacy lawsuits in the United States.  
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the present day, battles over privacy reflect historical conflicts.37 There is always tension 
between the individual need for privacy and autonomy, and the sense that society suffers 
when morality goes unregulated.38   
 Over the years the Supreme Court has developed a limited right to privacy in a 
string of cases: Griswold v. Connecticut,39 Roe v. Wade,40 Whalen v. Roe41 and Bowers 
v. Hardwick.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
37 Id at 313. 
38 Id. 
39 381U.S. 479 (1965). In this case the Appellant was a licensed physician and a professor at the Yale 
Medical School. He gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means 
of preventing conception. The wife was examined and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material 
for her use. Sections 53—32 of the general statutes of Connecticut law provide that:  'Any person who uses 
any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less 
than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and 
imprisoned.’ The Supreme Court held that the Connecticut law forbidding use of contraceptives 
unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy. 
40 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In this case, a pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the 
constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion 
except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. The District Courts judgement was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas and held that the abortion statutes were void as vague and over 
broadly infringing the plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
41 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Physicians and patients brought an action challenging the constitutionality of New 
York statutes which required that the state be provided with a copy of every prescription for certain drugs 
and which also provided security measures for that information in the state's possession. The Supreme 
Court held that the statutes were a reasonable exercise of the state's broad police power; that finding that 
the state had not shown necessity for the requirement was insufficient basis for holding the statutes 
unconstitutional. 
42 478 U.S. 186 (1986). A Practicing homosexual brought action challenging constitutionality of Georgia 
sodomy statute. The Supreme Court held that Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental 
rights of homosexuals. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
A. An Analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
 The Fourth Amendment43 is an expression of an “eloquent, unequivocal principle 
of a democratic government.”44 The framers of the constitution intended the Fourth 
Amendment to protect the citizens against indiscriminate and arbitrary general authority, 
which had been asserted by the British against the American colonies.45 The purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment was to protect the citizens against unwarranted intrusions, but 
was not intended as a general restraint against all police practices.46 The modern 
development of the Fourth Amendment can be best summarized in the article “The Right 
to Privacy”, in which Warren and Brandies clearly stated that “[T]he individual shall 
have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but 
it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent 
of such protection.”47 The concept of "reasonable expectations of privacy"48 is at the 
forefront of all Fourth Amendment analysis.49 It is the starting point for any defendant 
                                                                 
43 supra note 27.  
44 Gerald K. Freund, Look Up In The Sky, It’s a Bird, It’d a Plane...It’s Reasonableness, 20 Sw. U.L. 
Rev.195, 198 (1991).  
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 supra note 21 at 193. 
48 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “reasonable” as: Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the 
circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end in view. Having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by 
reason; under the influence of reason; agreeable to reason. Thinking, speaking, or acting according to the 
dictates of reason. Not immoderate or excessive, being synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair, 
suitable, moderate, tolerable. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1138 ( 5th ed. 1979).  
49 Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, And The Concept Of The 
Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 907, 908 (1997). 
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seeking to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.50 If a 
defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area searched or an 
item seized, he does not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation. 51 “The Fourth 
Amendment reflects the framers of the Constitution’s determination that individuals in a 
democratic society be able to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from government 
intrusions.”52 The case of Boyd v. United States53 which was decided a century after the 
passage of the Bill of Rights, was the first significant Supreme Court decision involving 
the Fourth Amendment as well as the Fifth Amendment privilege agains t self-
incrimination. 54 It recognized that the Fourth Amendment “was to apply to all invasions 
on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the 
privacies of life.”55 In the absence of a search or seizure, however, the Fourth 
Amendment is not implicated by police action. 56 For nearly fifty years, beginning in 1928 
with Olmstead v. United States,57 the U.S. Supreme Court premised the existence of a 
search on whether a physical trespass had occurred under the local property law.58 In this 
case, the petitioners were convicted in the District Court for the Western District of 
Washington of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA) by 
                                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation Of The Value and Means Models Of The Fourth Amendment In The 
Age Of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 647, 649 (1988). 
53 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746, 3 A.F.T.R. 2488 U.S.N.Y, (1886). In this case Justice Bradley 
decided that “it does not require actual entry upon premises and search for and seizure of papers to 
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment; a compulsory 
production of a party's private books and papers, to be used against himself or his property in a criminal or 
penal proceeding, or for a forfeiture, is within the spirit and meaning of the amendment.” 
54 Gutterman, supra Note 51 at 651. 
55 Id. 
56 Richard S. Julie, High-Tech surveillance Tools And The Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy In The Technological Age, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 128 (2000). 
57 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).  
58 Julie, supra note 56. 
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unlawfully possessing, transporting and importing intoxicating liquors.59 The 
information, which lead to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and extent, was 
largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators by the 
federal prohibition officers.60 Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone 
wires from the residences of four of the petitioners and those leading from the chief 
office.61 The insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the 
defendants.62 The federal officers at the wires heard the orders given for liquor by 
customers and the acceptances; they became auditors of the conversations between the 
partners.63 All this disclosed the conspiracy charged in the indictment, and many of the 
intercepted conversations were not merely reports, but parts of criminal acts.64 The 
Supreme Court of the United States held that the wiretapping committed by the federal 
prohibition officers did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.65 The Court in the case of Olmstead, held that the only interest 
protected by the Fourth Amendment were those in tangible objects, such as papers, 
houses, and other physical possessions, and that those possessions were protected only 
against physical invasions.66 Overheard conversations and other types of communicative 
evidence, therefore, had no specific protection, unless obtained in the violation of local 
property law. 67 When does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment? The court in Olmstead read the Fourth Amendment in the literal 
                                                                 
59 supra note 57 at 456. 
60 Id at 456, 457. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id at 468. 
66 Julie, supra note 56 at 129. 
67 Id. 
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sense as to include “persons”, “houses”, “papers” and “effects”. 68 Even literally 
construed, these material things that were afforded protection by the text of the Fourth 
Amendment did not include public telephone wires or the messages they transmitted.69 
Thus there was no deterrent to prevent the government agents from using electric devices 
to listen to private phone conversations.70  But the case of Katz v. United States71 changed 
all that. In this case, the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had placed an 
“electronic listening and recording device” outside the phone booth that Charles Katz was 
using to place a bet with his bookie.72 At trial, the District Court for the Southern District 
of California permitted the government, over the petitioner’s objections, to introduce 
evidence of the petitioner’s end of the conversations and Charles was convicted.73 The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and rejected the contention that the recordings 
were obtained in violation of the Forth Amendment because “[T]here was no physical 
entrance into the area occupied by the petitioner.”74  
According to Charles the Fourth Amendment provided a substantive right that his 
conversation with his bookie over the pay phone, inside the glass booth, would remain 
                                                                 
68 Jones, supra note 49 at 912. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
72 Id at 349. 
73 Id at 348. 
74 Id. 18 U.S.C. s 1084. The Statute provides in pertinent part: 
'(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication 
facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in 
the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmis sion of a wire 
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for 
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined no more than $10,000 or imprisoned 
not more than two years, or both.’  
'(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce 
of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of 
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where 
betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal.' 
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private.75 The government argued that Charles had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the agents had not physically entered the phone booth; the phone booth was open 
to all members of the public; and the glass made the activity inside the booth visible to 
the public.76  The government stressed on the fact that the telephone booth from which 
Charles made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he 
entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside.77 But when Charles entered 
the telephone booth to make the call, what he sought to exclude was not an intruding eye 
but an uninvited ear.78 
 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Charles, stating: “The Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. But what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”79 The court recognized that the proscriptions of the Fourth 
Amendment were no longer limited to tangible things.80 Katz now represents the “new” 
way of thinking about the Fourth Amendment and how it protects individuals.81 It has 
now allowed the court to adopt a broad construction that allows the amendment to adapt 
to the changing needs of society. 82  
 
                                                                 
75 supra note 71 at 349. 
76 Id at 348-354. 
77 Id at 351. 
78 Id. 
79 Jones, supra note 49 at 913. 
80 Id at 914. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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B. Objective versus Subjective Expectation of Privacy  
 The Katz standard had revolutionized the court’s Fourth Amendment analysis.83 
After the Katz decision there have been various judicial decisions on cases where the 
Courts have demarcated whether a person can anticipate a subjective or an objective 
expectation of privacy. 84 In United States v. Chadwick85 the Supreme Court recognized 
that a person has an expectation of privacy in a package or a container, and the Fourth 
Amendment protects this privacy interest.86 In particular the court considered whether an 
individual’s expectation of privacy in a footlocker taken from the trunk of a car violated a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 87 A subjective expectation of privacy consists of a 
belief that uninvited people will not intrude in a particular area, i.e., that “one may freely 
admit guests of one’s choosing…without sacrificing one’s right to expect that a space 
will remain secure against all others.”88 As the court stated in United States v. Gerena,89 
“[A] defendant must demonstrate that his or her professed subjective expectation of 
privacy viewed from the totality of the circumstances, is at least of a quality similar in 
significant respects, to the privacy expectations one would ordinarily expect an individual 
to have with regard to his or her home or office.”90 If a person took precautions to 
                                                                 
83 Madeline A. Herdrich, California v. Greenwood: The Thrashing Of Privacy, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 993, 
1001 (1989). 
84 Id at 1001. 
85 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476  (1977). The FBI agents opened the footlocker of the respondents without the 
respondents' consent or a search warrant and found large amounts of marijuana in it. The Supreme Court of 
the United States affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals stating that the search was conducted more 
than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents 
were securely in custody; therefore the search could not be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified 
by any other exigency. The Respondents were entitled to the protection of the Warrant Clause and their 
privacy interests in the contents of the footlocker were not eliminated simply because they were under 
arrest. 
86 Herdrich, supra note 83 at 1002.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
87 Id. 
88 Freund, supra note 44 at 201.  
89 662 F.Supp.1218,1218 (D.Conn. 1987). 
90 Id at 1237. 
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exclude others, this would heighten any legitimate expectation of privacy. 91 However a 
question will arise, when a person is trying to prevent one type of intrusion, whether the 
person is trying to prevent all types of intrusions.92 This kind of determination is a 
question of fact for the courts.93 A Person’s actions can be used to overcome a claim that 
a subjective expectation of privacy existed.94 Therefore searches conducted with the 
consent of the individual are exempt from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.95 
Implied consent can be reasonably used but then strict standards would apply.96 Hence, a 
person calling for help would not diminish his or her expectation of privacy, but 
voluntary abandonment of property would destroy any expectation of privacy. 97 If a 
person wants to retain his privacy interest there has to be no abandonment.98 A person 
also looses his privacy when he shares information or shares the same areas with another 
person. 99 But as seen in the Katz decision, 100 a person will have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy even in areas open to the public as long as it is his intention to keep his privacy 
in public.101 At the same time a person cannot maintain an expectation of privacy in an 
area, which is shared by others.102 Providing property to an unknown person can 
completely destroy a person’s subjective expectation of privacy. 103 
                                                                 
91 Freund, supra note 44 at 202. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 supra  footnote 71. 
101 Id. 
102 United States v. Anderson 8598 F.2d 1171, 1177 (1988) (the trunk of the car which is shared by 
another). 
103 Rawlings v. Kentucky 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980). 
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 Unlike the subjective expectation of privacy, all objective expectations of privacy 
are a matter of law rather than fact.104 The legitimacy of a person’s claim to privacy is 
determined “in light of all the surrounding circumstances,”105 or as the court in United 
States v. Baron-Mantilla phrased it, by “the totality of the circumstances.”106 Hence, a 
determination whether a search is reasonable requires an examination of the incident and 
the final determination of reasonableness requires balancing, on one hand, an individual’s 
legitimate expectation of privacy, and on the other hand, the government’s need for 
effective law enforcement.107 In addressing this objective prong, in Smith v. Maryland,108 
the court considered whether the government's use of a telephone company’s pen register 
to record telephone numbers from a suspect’s home was an intrusion of his privacy. 109 
The telephone company, at police request, installed a pen register at its central offices to 
record the numbers dialed from the telephone at petitioner's home.110 The petitioner 
moved to suppress all information derived from the pen register.111 The Maryland trial 
court denied this motion, holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment.112 The petitioner was convicted, and the Maryland 
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Court of Appeals affirmed.113 In the case of California v. Ciraolo,114 officers of the Santa 
Clara police who were trained in marijuana identification secured a private airplane, flew 
over respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet, and readily identified marijuana 
plants growing in the yard.115 A search warrant was later obtained on the basis of a 
photograph taken from the plane of the surrounding area, the warrant was executed and 
the marijuana plants were seized.116 The California trial court denied respondent's motion 
to suppress the evidence of the search, and the California Court of Appeal reversed on the 
ground that the warrantless aerial observation of respondent's yard violated the Fourth 
Amendment.117 But the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Court of Appeals and 
held that the warrantless aerial observation of a fenced- in backyard within the curtilage of 
a home was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.118  
 
C. Concept of Seizure 
 A person is said to have been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment anytime when an officer conveys to that individual that he is no longer free 
"to walk away" or " to ignore the police presence and go about his business."119 A person 
does not have to be handcuffed and taken to the police station in order to have been 
seized.120 The police authority can affect a seizure by applying physical force or by a 
show of authority. 121 In Michigan v. Chesternut, the defendant argued that he was 
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unlawfully seized during police pursuit.122 Four police officers riding in a marked police 
cruiser were engaged in routine patrol duties in metropolitan Detroit.123 The defendant 
was standing on the curb.124 The defendant noticed the police car and started running 
away.125 The officers followed the defendant in the patrol car, caught up with him and 
drove alongside him for a short distance.126 As they drove beside him, the officers 
observed respondent discard a number of packets he pulled from his right-hand pocket.127 
An officer got out of the cruiser to examine the packets.128 He discovered that they 
contained pills.129 When the officer was engaged in the inspection, the respondent who 
was running a few paces ahead stopped.130 Surmising on the basis of his experience as a 
paramedic that the pills contained cocaine, the officer arrested the respondent for the 
possession of narcotics and took him to the station house.131 During an ensuing search, 
the police discovered in the respondent's hatband another packet of pills, a packet 
containing heroin, and a hypodermic needle.132 The Respondent was charged with 
knowingly and intentionally possessing heroin, tablets containing codeine, and tablets 
containing diazepam, in violation of Mich.Comp.Laws § 333.7403(2) (1980).133 Justice 
Blackmun of the Supreme Court held that “no seizure of defendant occurred when police 
officers in an automobile observed, the defendant upon seeing the automobile, started to 
run, and officers accele rated to catch up to defendant and then drove alongside him 
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before he discarded a pack of pills, which the officers then seized.”134 The Court 
disagreed with the defendant finding that no Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred by 
the officers' conduct preceding the physical custody because a reasonable person would 
not have felt compelled to stop.135 
 In the case of California v. Hodari,136 the defendant fled at the approach of an 
unmarked police car.137 The police gave chase and when the policeman was about to 
tackle the defendant, the defendant tossed away a small rock of crack cocaine.138 The 
main issue in this case was whether, the defendant was seized within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.139 The exact moment of the seizure had to be determined.140 If the 
seizure occurred when the defendant was tackled, the abandoned drugs would be 
admissible.141 If the seizure occurred by the show of authority in chasing the suspect 
while wearing police jackets, then the evidence would be inadmissible.142 In order for 
"seizure" to have occurred, there must either be some application of physical force, even 
if extremely slight, or a show of authority to which the subject yields; a show of 
authority, without any application of physical force, to which the subject does not yield is 
not a seizure.143 In this case, there was no application of physical force by the police.144 
The defendant did not stop at the show of authority constituted by the chase of the police 
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and was therefore not “seized” when tackled.145 The Court held that the cocaine 
abandoned while the defendant was running was not the fruit of a seizure.146 
 In situations involving a police chase, a two part inquiry must be satisfied: (1) 
Was there a display of authority, or application of physical force, sufficient to convey to a 
reasonable person that he is no longer free to leave, and (2) Did the show of authority 
and/or application of physical force actually produce a stop?147 The protections of the 
Fourth Amendment apply when both questions are confirmed in the affirmative.148  
 
D. Concept of a Search 
 The concept of a search is also grounded in the determination of " reasonable 
expectation of privacy."149 However, unlike the "seizure" cases, discussions of reasonable 
expectations of privacy are most often found in cases dealing with searches.150 Search 
activity carries a lot more potentiality for the invasion of a person’s privacy expectations 
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than does a seizure.151 An individual whose reasonable expectation of privacy has not 
been violated has not, by definition, been subjected to a Fourth Amendment “search” or 
“seizure”.152 Therefore in order to determine whether a Fourth Amendment “search” has 
occurred, the Court must determine whether the accused’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy has been violated.153 As a general rule, “looking at what is already exposed to 
view” is not considered a “search”. 154 Asking the question whether the item was in the 
plain view when observed leads to the question whether the Fourth Amendment applies 
to all.155 In the case of Florida v. Riley156 the Florida Supreme Court stated that “[T]he 
police may see what may be seen from a public vantage point where (they have) a right to 
be. Once the police are lawfully in a position to observe an item firsthand, the owner’s 
privacy interest in that item is lost. The owner can retain the title and possession of that 
item but not its privacy.”157 The issue would, however, become more complex if the 
police observation goes to such an extreme that it would be questionable as to whether it 
is reasonable to assume that any member of the public would ever make an observation 
despite the fact that the public could legally make the same.158 
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  In the case of California v. Ciraolo159, for example the Court held that the police 
officers' warrantless aerial observation, from an altitude of 1,000 feet, during which the 
plants were readily visible to the naked eye, did not violate homeowner's Fourth 
Amendment rights.160 Since airplanes routinely fly at such high altitudes in general, any 
member of the public flying at that altitude could have observed the defendant’s 
backyard.161 But in this case the question would arise whether the public would ever 
make such an observation of the defendant’s backyard.   
 The police have a right to be in any place where the public may go.162 In the case 
of Florida v. Riley,163 the Court made the observation that “if a police officer can observe 
anything in a person’s home while in a position where any member of the public can 
make the same observation, then the object which is seen by the officer is said to be 
clearly visible or has been knowingly exposed to the public.”164 In this case the defendant 
did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance. “[A]ny 
member of the pubic could have legally been flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter 
at an altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s greenhouse. The police officer 
did no more….[W]e would have a different case if flying at that altitude had been 
contrary to law or regulation.”165  
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 While a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from another’s 
view if the object is exposed to the public, the opposite is also true: one does have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy if the item or area is not exposed to another’s view. 166 
Consequently, if an object has to be moved in order to view evidence, the evidence is not 
exposed and there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 167 In the case of Arizona v. 
Hicks,168 the police officers had entered the respondent’s apartment to find the person 
who fired a bullet through the floor of the apartment.169 The respondent had fired a bullet 
through the floor, which had injured a man on the floor below. 170 While the policemen 
were in the apartment they noticed two sets of expensive stereo components and, 
suspecting that they were stolen, read and recorded their serial numbers.171 They moved 
some of the equipment, including a turntable, to do so and phoned in the numbers to 
headquarters.172 Upon learning that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, the 
officer seized it immediately.173 The Supreme Court had to determine whether the act of 
moving the property to view the serial number was a “search” activity within the Fourth 
Amendment.174 The court held that a reasonable expectation of privacy had been 
infringed by a “search”. 175 By touching the property and moving it, the police officer 
“exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment and its contents.”176 As such, the 
court did not take into consideration that the officer was only looking for a non-private 
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serial number on the property and nothing else was revealed by his actions.177 What 
mattered to the court was that the officer’s act exposed an area to the officer’s senses that 
would otherwise have not been exposed.178 The Court stated: “It matters not that the 
search uncovered nothing of any great personal value….A search is a search, even if it 
happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.”179 
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CHAPTER 3 
ADVANCEMENT IN THE FIELD OF POLICE TECHNOLOGY 
 One hundred years ago, Brandeis and Warren had the foresight to state:  
“The intensity and complexity of life…have rendered necessary some retreat from the 
world, and man…has become more sensitive…so that solitude and privacy, subjected 
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily 
injury.”180 Since that time, the advancement in the field of technology and the increasing 
complexities of society have posed serious questions about rightful intrusions of the 
government on the privacy of citizens.181 
 Information technology, communications and computer technology are 
characterized by dramatic innovations.182 Automated teller machines, computerized 
reservation systems, full text databases and a myriad of other developments represent 
great advances in convenience and human capabilities.183 With the recent developments 
in police surveillance technology there is a clash between an individual’s right to keep a 
secret and the state’s power to penetrate that secret.184 Modern technology has advanced 
to such an extent that the cases dealing with the impact of this technology have become 
very diverse and complex. 185 The court has been faced with the issues of arising out of 
the use of, among other things, aircraft, medical technologies, electronic listening devices 
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and devices which provide for visual enhancement.186 Generally technology provides 
police with a vantage point that most individuals cannot share.187 Since police 
observation often depends on the use of expensive and sophisticated machinery, the 
ability to intrude is often unexpected.188  
 Advances in the field of information technology are rendering obsolete traditional 
processes and frameworks for the regulation of law enforcement surveillance methods.189 
As of today, surveillance is no longer limited by darkness, whispers or distance.190 As 
criminals have grown more sophisticated, criminal investigators have resorted to state-of-
the-art technologies in order to curb criminal activity. 191  
 Below is a description of some of the latest police technologies, which have given 
rise to some serious privacy concerns.  
 
A. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network  
 First conceived in 1981, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
got official life in 1990.192 The mission of FinCEN is to support law enforcement 
investigative efforts and promote interagency and global cooperation against domestic 
and international financial crimes and to provide the United States policy makers with 
strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide trends and patterns.193 FinCEN works 
toward those ends through information collection, analysis and sharing, as well as 
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technological assistance and innovative, cost-effective implementation of the Bank 
Secrecy Act and other Treasury authorities.194 
 FinCen’s main mission is (1) to gather financial and related records and data from 
federal, state, local and foreign agencies (2) to analyze collected records for evidence of 
money laundering and other financial crimes and (3) to disseminate its findings to law 
enforcement agencies in the United States and abroad.195 FinCen is a unique kind of 
enforcement tool.196 It is a hybrid between a database and a focused surveillance tool and 
combines qualities of many surveillance technologies.197 It embodies the qualities of a 
tracking device, pen register, a bloodhound, a hidden camera, wiretap, a high powered 
telescope or even a parabolic microphone. It can be used to observe individuals without 
even alerting them of its presence of surveillance.198 FinCEN is not like any common law 
enforcement technology; it has a certain measure of intelligence.199 The FinCEN’s 
database is linked via computer networks to computers at other agencies, which comb 
through a vast amount of data routinely by way of vigilant software.200 It is like a human 
detective; the case based expert system conducts a focused inquiry, seeking leads, 
hunting traces of illicit behavior, combining related pieces of information, and attempting 
to connect individual suspects to a pattern of suspected criminal activity. 201  
 Why would FinCEN cause a threat to privacy? When records of our everyday 
transactions are stored in massive databases and periodically searched for unspecified 
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patterns thought to signal illicit activity, individuals are constrained in their thoughts, 
choices and acts.202 We should have the right to enlarge our conception of the personal 
domain to not only include our body, but also a certain amount of breathing space around 
our body. 203  Every individual has the right to make his own choices and decisions and 
decide what personal information to disclose to others and what to conceal. FinCEN 
threatens privacy by revealing a broad range of personal information never disclosed in 
any meaningful sense by its subjects.204 Continuous data base surveillance by an expert- 
system computer network has a chilling effect on legitimate activity. 205 By contracting 
the sphere of autonomy, it threatens to “deprive us of that liberty on which our humanity 
fundamentally rests.”206 
 
B. Global Positioning System. 
 To know one’s location and how to navigate to particular places are concerns that 
have affected generations for years.207 Since the 1950s, a number of positioning 
technologies have been developed.208 These include two very popular marine navigation 
systems based on transmission of radio signals: OMEGA and Loran-C.209 The primary 
disadvantages of these systems were lack of precision, global coverage, and inaccuracy in 
areas of rugged terrain. 210 During the 1980’s, the first Global Positioning System (GPS) 
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signals became available for use by non-military researchers.211 The cost of equipment 
was very high and it was assumed that civilian uses requiring high precision would be 
limited to geodesy and civil engineering. 212 As low-grade field units for the military 
became physically smaller and less expensive, the manufacturers of receivers began to 
look at other potential markets.213 At the same time, the rapidly expanding geographic 
information systems (GIS) profession developed needs for inexpensive and rapid 
methods of capturing high quality spatial information. 214 With the full development of the 
GPS constellation of satellites in 1993, a new tool for general use arrived.215 GPS 
receivers are now another $200 electric commodity, which is often found in the sporting 
goods section of a local department store.216 GPS is based on satellite ranging. 217 If a 
person knows the location of the satellite, he will be able to derive another location by 
using basic trigonometry. 218 In order to determine a person’s position accurately, one 
must know the exact location of several satellites.219 A receiver needs four satellites to 
pinpoint any spot on the globe, one for each of the variables, i.e., longitude, latitude, 
elevation and time.220 GPS is a huge success as the satellite clocks are so accurate that a 
location can be determined within centimeters.221 The Global Positioning System allows 
a person (as well as others) to know where they are at all times.222 If you go to an 
unfamiliar city and rent a car which has a Global Positioning System (GPS) installed in it, 
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you can program your destination into the dashboard-mounted computer and listen to the 
computer generated voice which will help you make all the proper turns to get to your 
destination. 223 What happens is that there are a series of satellites that send signals to help 
the onboard computer determine the position of the car, and the computer coordinates the 
signals with a mapping program, which gives the accurate driving instructions.224 This is 
a unique form of an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), which serves as a personal 
navigation assistance device.225 Along with route guidance, GPS is also able to provide 
real-time information about traffic congestion and adverse weather conditions between a 
driver’s current location and his destination. 226  GPS, in conjunction with the internet, can 
guide people to their destination, find lost people, send emergency aid to those in trouble 
and track a person’s whereabouts instantaneously.227 It was used by the U.S. military 
after the war in Vietnam and was designed to track the exact location of U.S. military 
troops in the fields.228  
 But this unique Intelligent Transportation tool poses a strong privacy risk. If you 
scroll down the menu for the GPS unit, there is a function that shows past history. 229 For 
example, you can see how fast the previous renter of the car traveled,230 or the driving 
record of the renter could be revealed. The Illinois Tollway Authority is conducting a 
feasibility study to use GPS technology to replace motorists tossing coins into the toll 
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baskets.231 Instead, motorists using the Illinois tollways would be billed for actual miles 
driven based on information in onboard computers logging the roadway use through 
GPS.232  If this system becomes a reality the state tollway authority will be able to collect 
vast amounts of information and the question is: How will they use it?233 Personal data 
could be given or sold to third parties, which could adversely affect the renter, or it could 
be given to law enforcement officials.234 Returning to the car rental example, would there 
be any potential privacy rights violations by the installation of GPS?235 Assuming that the 
GPS requires activation by the renter, there may not be any personal rights violated; it 
would be a voluntary decision whether to activate the system or not.236 But the user may 
not be aware that the system maintains information long after its use.237 GPS is such a 
sophisticated tool that it may become a substitute for an individual itself.238 The GPS 
generated travel profiles will threaten privacy, as this type of profiling will be 
dehumanizing to the individual.239 If the profile is different from the individual’s own 
image, the separation can be psychologically damaging.240 An individual will loose his 
self-respect, as the tendency of GPS is to reduce the complexity of an individual’s human 
personality to ciphers and formulas.241 It makes no difference that the information 
gathered is not personal or private, when compared, for example, with data about a 
person’s health or financial status.242 Individuals will be concerned when a 
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comprehensive information profile is constructed about any aspect of their life.243 Also, 
in a way, the transportation information collected will be likely to reveal some aspects of 
a person’s private life. It might reveal, for example, where the person shops, works, 
worships, reads, views movies or buys books.244  
 
C. Mobile Telecommunications. 
 The greatest feature of wireless communications is the ability to send and receive 
messages from anywhere.245 Many people can be tracked today without the use of 
cameras or other devices.246 In order to carry or receive calls, cellular phones must 
communicate their location to a base station. 247 Therefore, whenever a cell phone is in 
use, or set to receive calls, it effectively identifies the location of its user every few 
minutes (within an area defined by the tolerance of the phone).248 There are numerous 
consumer benefits from technologies that track the location of mobile phone users. For 
example, consider the following situation: Suppose an individual’s purse has just been 
stolen. 249 His partner’s one-button mobile call to an emergency service immediately 
pinpoints the individual’s location for the police, and the mobile phone inside the purse 
allows the police to quickly track down the culprit.250 Your always-on mobile phone 
produces a signal that allows the police to follow your every movement with pinpoint 
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precision. 251 In January 1997, Karen Nelson got lost while driving through a blizzard on a 
remote stretch of South Dakota highway and drove her truck off the road into a snow 
bank.252 Nelson had a cellular phone with her and was able to call 911 for help, but she 
did not know her location. 253 Since the emergency workers had no way of accurately 
determining her location, it took almost 40 hours and a massive rescue operation 
involving snow mobiles and airplanes before searchers finally located Nelson’s truck.254 
In order to provide the same level of 911 service to cellular telephone users as is currently 
available to regular telephone users, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
requires cellular telephone companies to have the capability of determining the location 
from which a cellular phone call originates to within 125 meters.255 If Karen Nelson’s 
accident had happened today, the South Dakota 911 operators could reduce the time 
taken it took to rescue Karen from hours to minutes.256 
The enhanced 911, or E911 service has several stages.257 At the most basic level, the FCC 
requires emergency calls to be routed to a central processing center and to be transmitted 
without regard to validation of the caller’s status as a subscriber.258 At the more advanced 
level, the FCC requires the carriers to provide location information of all wireless 911 
callers to these processing centers.259 The Phase I of the FCC rules require carriers to 
provide information on the base station handling the call, which may narrow down the 
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location of the caller to a few city blocks in a dense area or a few miles in the case of a 
rural analogue cellular system. 260 The phase II rules, requires carriers to provide location 
information with much greater precision. 261 According to the FCC timetable, U.S. 
wireless carriers will have significant mobile location capabilities by 2005.262 
 The cellular telephone call location technology now mandated by the FCC will 
turn each of the more than fifty million cell phones in the United States into a tracking 
device.263 This poses a major privacy hazard. The very thought that your cell phone is a 
giveaway of your location is frightening. Consumers clearly will be concerned about 
securing their privacy against revealing location information without their consent.264 In 
the United States, in response to concerns expressed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation that new telecommunications technologies could hinder criminal 
investigations, Congress passed the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement 
Act (CALEA).265 During the brief congressional debate leading up to CALEA’s passage, 
then FBI director Louis Freeh stated that the FBI did not wish to turn wireless phones 
into location-tracking devices. He stated: “There is no intention whatsoever to acquire 
anything that could properly be called ‘tracking information’.”266 However, United States 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Federal Communications Comm’n,267 in implementing 
CALEA, the FCC agreed to permit law enforcement agencies such as the FBI to have 
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access to caller’s locations at the beginning and end of each call.268 The District of 
Columbia Circuit responded by holding that law enforcement would need more than a 
mere pen-register--an order that can be obtained without a search warrant.269 Mobile 
location technologies promise a dramatic improvement in the safety and convenience 
available to subscribers to wireless telecommunications services.270 But at the same time 
consumers will be apprehensive to subscribe to these services without adequate 
assurances for their privacy. 271 All over the world the burden of demonstrating adequate 
assurances for privacy is likely to fall upon mobile telecommunications carriers who wish 
to offer their services to their subscribers.272   
 
D. Wearable Computing and Surveillance Cameras. 
 “ I AM A CAMERA”. 273 Wearable Computing promises to become the fourth 
wave of computing following the developments of the mainframe, minicomputers and 
personal computers.274 A wearable computer is a computing device that is worn on the 
body consisting of some type of output display, such as a small, eyeglass-size monitor, 
and some input device, such as a one-handed keyboard or speech recognition system.275 
At the McLuhan Symposium on Culture and Technology, 276 Professor Steve Mann277 
stated:  
                                                                 
 
269 Id at 453. 
270 Wimmer, supra note 248 at 23. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 “ Many Dimensions: The Extensions of Marshall McLuhan.” Keynote address at the McLuhan 
Symposium on Culture and Technology on October 23, 1998. available at http://wearcam.org/mcluhan-
keynote.htm  
274 Amy M. Intille, Video Surveillance and Privacy: Implications for Wearable Computing, 32 Suffolk U. 
L. Rev. 729, 751 (1999). 
275 Id. 
276 McLuhan, supra  note 87. 
 34 
“Just as the wheel is an extension of the leg, and radio is an extension of the voice, so too, 
is the camera an extension of the eye, the computer [is] an extension of the brain, and 
wiring, circuits, and the internet an extension of the nervous system.” 
A wearable computer has the following characteristics:  
(1) It is portable when operational - The most distinguishing feature of a wearable is that 
it can be used while walking or otherwise moving around.278 This is a distinguishing 
feature between  wearables and desktop and laptop computers.279  
(2) Hands free use - Military and industrial applications for wearables especially 
emphasize their hands-free aspect, and concentrate on speech input and heads-up display 
or voice output.280 Other wearables might also use chording-keyboards, dials, and 
joysticks to minimize the tying up of a user's hands.281  
(3) Sensors – The wearable computer incorporates sensors such as wireless 
communications, GPS, cameras, or microphones.282  
(4) Always on and always running - By default a wearable is always on and working, 
sensing, and acting. 283 It is also ‘Proactive’ i.e. it is able to convey information to its user 
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even when not actively being used.284 For example, if your computer wants to let you 
know that you have new email and whom the email is from, it will be able to 
communicate this information to you immediately. 285  
 Video surveillance and wearable computing share a critical component part i.e. 
the video camera, which is a powerful technology tool that can significantly invade 
privacy. 286 Video technology has changed the way people view the world around them 
and the way people are viewed.287 Over the years the camcorder has had numerous 
advantages; there have been well-publicized and famous examples of surreptitious 
filming serving the public good.288 The most celebrated was George Holliday's videotape 
of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King. 289 Other well-publicized examples 
include an environmentalist who filmed fishermen slaughtering dolphins caught in tuna 
nets, a suspicious parent who taped his baby sitter abusing his child, and a gay man in 
California who, fed up with abusive taunting from his neighbor, set up a camcorder and 
filmed the neighbor assaulting him in his front yard.290 However these instances of 
positive, surreptitious videotaping are overshadowed by many more situations when 
video cameras have intruded unreasonably upon and individual’s privacy. 291 Voyeurs 
have frequently used the video camera to surreptitiously record people in private 
settings.292 In the United States, over sixty urban centers use video surveillance in public 
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places for law enforcement purposes.293 Television broadcasting corporations and 
viewers in the United States seem addicted to the vicarious thrill of watching invasions of 
others’ privacy. 294 The number of surveillance cameras of all types in America is 
overwhelming and growing every day. 295 Recently, the New York Civil Liberties Union 
sent a survey team into Manhattan to count surveillance cameras.296 The team counted 
more than 2,400 cameras monitoring the movements of pedestrians, drivers, shoppers, 
and anyone else who wandered into their range.297 Great Britain is the world’s pioneer of 
closed circuit television surveillance and over one million cameras are in place.298 Three 
hundred different cameras on thirty different networks monitor an average person in 
London during the course of a single day. 299 
 The ubiquitous use of the video camera, both through public and private 
surveillance, and the pervasive use of video camcorders have raised privacy concerns, 
and similarly, the use of wearable computers will also raise privacy issues.300 The ability 
of the wearable computer to constantly record audio and video from the user’s 
environment is the source for these privacy concerns.301 In addition to the privacy 
concerns raised by pervasive monitoring in video surveillance and wearable computing, 
tracking abilities associated with video surve illance and wearable computers also threaten 
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an individual’s privacy. 302 An increasing number of police departments in American 
cities have set up video surveillance cameras, which in addition to pervasive monitoring 
also have the ability to track an individual’s movement as they walk on a public street.303 
Like video surveillance systems, wearable computers represent a new threat to privacy 
rights because this powerful new technological tool can constantly record and store 
everything about a user’s environment through sensors.304 While wearable computers are 
a relatively new technology, it will become a pervasive toll used by almost all computer 
users in the near future.305 Currently there are no statutes or decisions regulating a 
wearable computer’s intrusion into personal privacy rights.306 But eventually, the 
wearable computer’s ability to record video and audio communications will encroach on 
an individual’s privacy. 307  
 
E.  Facial Recognition System. 
 An individual’s face is an important part of who he is and how people identify 
him.308 It would be very hard to recognize an individual if all faces looked the same.309 
Except in the case of identical twins, the face is arguably a person's most unique physical 
characteristic.310 While humans have had the inherent ability to recognize and distinguish 
different faces for millions of years, computers are just now catching up.311  
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 A ticket to the January 2000 Super Bowl XXXV in Tampa Bay, Florida, didn't 
just get the spectators a seat at the biggest professional football game of the year.312 
Those who attended the event were also part of the largest police lineup ever conducted, 
although they may not have been aware of it at the time.313 The Tampa Police department 
was testing out a new technology, called ‘FaceIt’, that allows snapsho ts of faces from the 
crowd to be compared to a database of criminal mug shots.314 Facial recognition software 
can be used to find criminals in a crowd, turning a mass of people into a big lineup.315 If 
you look in the mirror, you can see that your face has certain distinguishable 
landmarks.316 These are certain peaks and valleys that make up the different facial 
features.317 Visionics defines these landmarks as ‘nodal points’.318 There are about 80 
nodal points on a human face.319 The software measures a few of the nodal points, to 
name a few: The distance between the eyes, width of the nose, depth of the eye socket, 
cheekbones, jaw line and chin. 320  
 Facial recognition systems would be very beneficial to law enforcement agencies, 
in their efforts to catch law violators and terrorists. But several government agencies have 
abandoned facial- recognition systems after finding they did not work as advertised. These 
agencies include the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which experimented 
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with using the technology to identify people in cars at the Mexico-U.S. border.321 Face-
recognition software is useless in huge areas like the airports, as the technology simply 
isn't reliable enough for such an important security application. 322  
 The Facial Recognition system threatens privacy in a number of ways.323 One 
threat is the fact that facial recognition, in combination with wider use of video 
surveillance, would be likely to grow increasingly invasive over time.324 This kind of 
system can rarely be confined to its original purpose.325 New ways of using it will suggest 
themselves, the law enforcement authorities will find them to be an irresistible expansion 
of their power, and an individuals privacy will be destroyed.326 Ultimately, the threat is 
that widespread surveillance will change the character, feel, and quality of a human 
being’s life.327 
  Another problem that can arise is that of abuse of the system. 328 The use of facial 
recognition in public places -- for example: airports -- depends on widespread video 
monitoring, which is an intrusive form of surveillance that can record in graphic detail 
personal and private behavior.329 Over the years there have been numerous cases where 
video monitoring has been misused.330 After all, a human being eventually operates the 
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video camera.331 In Great Britain, for example, which has experimented with the 
widespread installation of closed circuit video cameras in public places, camera operators 
have been found to focus disproportionately on people of color, and the mostly male 
operators frequently focus specifically on women. 332 The question is “How necessary is 
facial recognition system for the security and safety of individuals?”333 With the recent 
terrorist attacks in the United States and around the world, the Government will always 
be justified in installing the new and latest surveillance devices for the protection of its 
citizens. But the law enforcing agencies should ask themselves two questions: First, how 
effective is the face recognition technology? 334 If the answer is no, then any further 
discussion is pointless.335 If the answer is yes, then the second question is whether the 
technology violates the appropriate balance between security and liberty. 336 In reality, 
facial recognition fails on both counts: as it does not work reliably and it doesn’t 
significantly protect an individual’s security. 337  
 
 
F. Thermal Imaging. 
 Thermal imaging is one of the latest technological tools in the government’s 
arsenal to identify and eliminate illegal indoor cultivation of marijuana.338  The indoor 
cultivation of marijuana has rendered the traditional methods of detecting it obsolete, thus 
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giving rise to widespread indoor cultivation of marijuana.339 Indoor cultivation is very 
lucrative since as many as four crops can be harvested annually.340 However the whole 
process of cultivation generates thermal energy, which either escapes or is vented to the 
outside.341 Such thermal energy can be detected by a thermal energy detection instrument, 
know as a ‘Forward Looking Infrared Radar’ (FLIR).342 This instrument senses 
differences in surface temperatures and can record its findings on videotape.343 Using 
FLIR generated visual images, law enforcement officials may assume that an individual 
is cultivating marijuana plants indoors.344 These inferences, when combined with other 
evidence, may then lead the police to discover illegal gardening operations.345 The 
question is whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment that his home will not be subjected to search by Thermal Imaging.   
The landmark case of Kyllo v. United States346 involved the use of thermal imaging. What 
happened in this case was that the law authorities suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana 
in his home triplex, the agents used a thermal imaging device to scan the triplex in order 
to determine if the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent with the high- 
intensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. 347 The scan showed that 
Kyllo's garage roof and a side wall were relatively hot compared to the rest of his home 
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and substantially warmer than the neighboring units.348 Based in part on the thermal 
imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home, where the 
agents found marijuana growing.349 After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he 
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a 
conditional guilty plea.350 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, upholding the thermal imaging on 
the ground that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had 
made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home.351 Even if he had, ruled the 
court, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the thermal 
imager did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on 
his home's exterior.352  
 But eventually the Supreme Court held that: 
 “Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to 
explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [F]ourth [A]mendment ‘search’, and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a search warrant.” 353 
“It is only when an individual exposes what is personal to the public, that the personal 
item loses its Fourth Amendment privacy protection.”354 In other words, the police are 
free to observe what everyone else can observe.355 But in the case of Kyllo, it was his 
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intention to keep his activity away from the view of the public.356 If the thermal imaging 
technology is used in a way, that it reveals marijuana plant cultivation only and nothing 
else, then, it may be appropriate to allow its use. The technology, however, can be 
misused i.e.-- it may be used to check if a person is present in his home, how many 
people are inside a house, and whether they are together or in separate rooms. This 
should not be allowed.357  
 
G. Canivore and Echelon  
 The main reason for computer security is data privacy. 358 People protect their 
systems so that unwanted people can't see data they're not authorized to see.359 The 
computer networks of the world are routinely used in the commission of serious criminal 
activities, including espionage, fraud and terrorist attacks.360 Modern day organized crime 
and terrorists rely “upon telecommunications to plan and execute their criminal activities 
on a daily basis.”361  
Carnivore is a sealed box that the FBI installs at an Internet Service Provider (ISP).362 
The box filters packets, looking for emails of suspected criminals.363 Once emails from 
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suspects are found, they are saved for decryption and analysis.364 The FBI claims that 
Carnivore is only meant for tapping the emails of suspected criminals.365 Also built into 
Carnivore is a remote-access capability that allows FBI agents to check on the progress of 
the Carnivore system.366 Authorities have used Carnivore-type tools more than 25 times in 
all types of criminal cases and in order to catch fugitives, drug dealers, extortionists and 
suspected foreign intelligence agents.367 Carnivore is now called ‘DCS-1000’.368  
              Carnivore is a major privacy risk. Even though it can be made active only by a 
court order and directed only towards a suspect’s email, there is no way for it to not 
intercept email of innocent private citizens while it scans for evidence in a criminal 
investigation. 369 Because Carnivore uses key words and phrases, it is likely to pick up 
email to and from people who have nothing to do with a crime simply because their email 
contains certain words.370 A recent article on CBSNews.com showed that the Carnivore is 
not a reliable way of catching criminals.371 The article reported that the FBI had 
destroyed evidence gathered in an investigation involving Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda 
terror network after the FBI’s Carnivore’s system mistakenly captured information to 
which the agency was not entitled.372 A March 2000 memo to agency headquarters in 
Washington stated that the FBI software had not only picked up targeted emails “but also 
picked up emails on non-covered targets.”373 “The FBI technical person was apparently 
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so upset that he destroyed all the email take, including the take on the suspect,” according 
to this memo.374 This episode was made public through a Freedom of Information Act 
request filed by the electronic Privacy Information Center, which is a Washington 
advocacy group.375 The material was not included in an original release but became 
public after a federal judge ordered the bureau to give out more documents.376 The issue 
in this case was an investigation in Denver in which the FBI’s Bin Laden unit was using 
the bureau’s Carnivore system to conduct electronic surveillance of a suspect under a 
Foreign Intelligence Act warrant.377 The suspect’s name and other information 
identifying details were marked out of the letter.378 The memo surfaced as the FBI was 
addressing concerns that it mishandled aspects of terrorism investigation prior to the 
September 11 attacks.379 Those concerns also focused on a warning from the FBI’s 
Phoenix office about Arab pilots training in the United States last July. 380 Privacy groups 
and some members of Congress have complained that Carnivore has the potential to 
collect more information than what is required.381 “Here’s confirmation of the fact that 
not only did it do that, but it resulted in a loss of legitimately acquired intelligence,” said 
David Sobel, general counsel of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the group that 
sued to get the documents.382  
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           ECHELON is a term associated with a global network of computers that 
automatically search through millions of intercepted messages for pre-programmed 
keywords or fax, telex and e-mail addresses.383 Every word of every message in the 
frequencies and channels selected at a station is automatically searched.384 The processors 
in the network are known as the ECHELON Dictionaries.385 ECHELON connects all 
these computers and allows the individual stations to function as distributed elements an 
integrated system. 386 
 ECHELON is a code word for an automated global interception and relay system 
operated by the intelligence agencies in five nations – the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.387 The original ECHELON dates back to 
1971.388 However, its capabilities and priorities have expanded greatly since its 
formation. According to recent reports, it is capable of intercepting and processing many 
types of transmissions throughout the globe.389 In fact, it has been suggested that 
ECHELON may intercept as many as three billion communications every day, including 
phone calls, e-mail messages, Internet downloads, satellite transmissions, and so on. 390 
How does ECHELON work?391 Apparently it collects data in several ways. Reports 
suggest it has massive ground based radio antennae to intercept satellite transmissions.392 
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In addition, some sites reputedly are tasked with tapping surface traffic.393 These 
antennae reportedly are in the United States, Italy, England, Turkey, New Zealand, 
Canada, Australia, and several other places.394 It is also believed that ECHELON uses 
numerous satellites to catch "overflow" data from transmissions between cities.395 These 
satellites then beam the information down to processing centers on the ground.396 The 
main centers are in the United States (near Denver), England (Menwith Hill), Australia, 
and Germany. 397 It is also believed that ECHELON has even used special underwater 
devices, which tap into cables that carry phone calls across the seas.398 According to 
published reports, American divers were able to install surveillance devices on to the 
underwater cables.399 One of these taps was discovered in 1982, but other devices 
apparently continued to function undetected.400 
 There is evidence to show that Echelon significantly invades privacy. Although 
the evidence is circumstantial, there are alleged violations by the secret surveillance of 
political organizations such as Amnesty International. 401 Many nations have laws, that 
prevent invasions of privacy. 402 But it is rumored that ECHELON has engaged in a trick 
in order to avoid these legal restrictions. For example, it is rumored that nations would 
not use their own agents to spy on their own citizens, but assign the task to agents from 
other countries.403 ECHELON is the ultimate in spy software.404 
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CHAPTER 4 
GLOBAL TRENDS IN PRIVACY PROTECTION.405 
A. India. 
 The Indian Constitution recognizes an impressive array of Fundamental Rights, 
covering a wide range of civil, political, cultural, economic and social rights.406 But the 
Constitution does not expressly recognize the right to privacy. 407 However Article 21 of 
the Constitution states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law.”408 
 In 1964, the Supreme Court first recognized that there is a right of privacy 
implicit in Art. 21.409 There are also other Indian laws that guarantee the right to 
privacy. 410 Unlawful attacks on the honor and reputation of a person can invite an action 
of tort or criminal law. 411 There are no general data protection laws in India.412 
Wiretapping is regulated under the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, and on December 20, 
1996, the Supreme Court of India ruled that: “[w]iretapping is a serious invasion of a 
persons privacy” and called for the government to update the century-old Indian 
Telegraph Act’s clause on interception. 413 This suit was a public interest suit brought by 
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the People’s Union for Civil Liberties.414   The Court ruled that an order for wiretapping 
could be issued only by the Federal Home Secretary - the most senior official in India's 
equivalent to the US Department of Justice.415 In "urgent" cases, this power can be 
delegated to slightly lower- level officials.416 The Court said: “Wiretaps can be used only 
if no ‘other reasonable means’ are available.”417 However, in this case, the Supreme 
Court did not rule on what exactly is in the public interest and what justifies 
interception. 418 Wiretapping in India is used by the Intelligence Bureau (Central Bureau 
of Investigation),419 which claims to be the longest-existing intelligence service in the 
world.420  
  However even after the modification of the act, there have been instances of 
illegal wiretapping by the Indian government.421 According to prominent Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) in India, the mail of many NGO’s in Delhi and 
other strife torn areas in India continue to be subjected to interception and censorship.422  
There are very comprehensive plans being made for a massive "citizens database" to be 
owned and operated by the state.423 It is rumored that this exercise will climax in a 
scheme called ‘NISHAN’ (National Identification System Home Affairs Network) or the 
INDIA CARD, by which all citizens will have to carry identity cards containing all 
relevant information (including legal records) about them, identifying photographs and 
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bio metric date (data about their body measurements, hand prints etc.).424 This kind of 
card is unnecessary as in India there are already various forms of identification-- For 
example, a driver’s license, a Ration card (this is issued by the government to buy 
groceries at a subsidized rate), a PAN (Permanent Account number) number given to all 
Indian citizens who pay taxes. The Union Minister of India, Mr. L.K. Advani is very keen 
on the implementation of INDIA CARD basically to check the influx of illegal 
immigrants.425 
 India is heading in the same direction as the west as people do end up giving more 
personal details than they would care to ordinarily when for credit cards and opening 
bank accounts.426 NISHAN will merely put it all together — apparently for use by the 
State — but the prospect of this data falling into wrong hands will rightfully make 
anybody suspicious of this scheme.427 If NISHAN is implemented, it will offer detailed 
information on every citizen and would mean that “Big Brother” has arrived in India.428 
 
B. The United Kingdom. 
 During the last decade, law enforcement agencies in Great Britain have 
increasingly relied on Close Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance to enhance public 
security. 429 According to some researchers, the camera surveillance systems in the UK 
are discouraging and thus preventing crime.430 Public video surveillance in the UK began 
very unassumingly in 1986, on a single square mile industrial estate outside the English 
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town of King's Lynn. 431 Three CCTV video surveillance cameras were used and their 
impact was immediate.432 In the years before the cameras were installed, there had been 
58 crimes recorded on the estate and in the two years following the installation, there 
were no crimes reported.433 Subsequently, cities and towns across Great Britain began 
using this crime prevention measure.434 By 1994, over three hundred jurisdictions in the 
country had installed some form of public video surveillance.435 In 1995, the national 
government made available up to $3.1 million in matching grants for cities and towns to 
establish CCTV video surveillance programs.436 There are currently nearly eight hundred 
local public video surveillance programs in operation in the UK and the British 
government provides $22 million annually in matching grants.437  
 According to the English civil libertarians, there is no control in the UK over the 
commercial use of public video images recorded by CCTV. 438 Because the United 
Kingdom has more video surveillance per capita than any other country in the world, it is 
very easy to find footage from parking garages, housing developments, department stores 
and offices that may have commercial value.439 Cameras may record women undressing 
in department store changing rooms, or husband and wives engaging in domestic 
squabbles.440  
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 The United Kingdom does not have a Bill of Rights that protects individuals from 
government intrusions on privacy. 441 Individuals have limited recourse against local 
government agencies that provide revealing tapes to commercial producers.442 While 
invasion-of-privacy lawsuits can be filed against the producers, they often protect 
themselves by making the footage sufficiently fuzzy to prevent clear identification of 
individuals.443  
 The UK is a member of the Council of Europe and has signed and ratified the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (ETS No. 108) along with the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.444 In addition to these commitments, the UK 
is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and has 
adopted the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data.445  
 
C. Australia. 
 Neither the Australian Federal Constitution nor the Constitution of the six States 
contains any express provisions relating to privacy. 446 After the terrorist attacks on 
America on September 11, 2001, the Australian Parliament passed the Cybercrime Bill 
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2001 and a series of bills to expand electronic surveillance powers and increase penalties 
for espionage.447 The principal federal statute is the Privacy Act of 1988.448  
 In December 2000, the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (the 
Amendment Act) was passed by federal Parliament.449  This amends the Privacy Act, 
which, until now, has mainly covered public sector agencies.450 The National Privacy 
Principles (NPPs) in the Privacy Act set out how private sector organizations should 
collect, use, keep secure and disclose personal information. 451  The principles give 
individuals a right to know what information an organization holds about them and a 
right to correct that information if it is wrong. 452 
 
D. Germany. 
 The German government has approved a surveillance regulation that is intended 
to make it easier for authorities to eavesdrop on communications via fixed- line and 
mobile phone, e-mail, fax, and SMS (short message service).453 This move put Berlin in 
line with other Western governments rushing to enact similar rules since the September 
11 terrorist attacks in the United States.454 The new rule, passed by the Cabinet requires 
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network providers to install and maintain equipment and procedures to give access to 
their customers' electronic traffic when authorities have a legal surveillance order.455  
 The technical requirements are limited to providers of “public telecommunication 
systems,” which include fixed- line and mobile phone operators and providers of e-mail 
accounts, but not ISPs (Internet service providers).456 However, "operators of the means 
of transmission that provide immediate user access to the Internet," such as DSL (digital 
subscriber line) connections, are also required to install the eavesdropping technology. 457 
In Germany, the largest such operator is ‘Deutsche Telekom AG’, which is the former 
incumbent telecom provider, which is still majority-owned by the state.458 
 The proposals for surveillance regulations were set by the Government officials 
before September 11, but faced heavy criticism from the IT and telecom industry, which 
complained of the high cost of installing the required equipment.459 However, industry 
representatives agreed to a compromise version of the regulations with the government 
officials.460 
  Not all industry concerns were addressed in the new version, said the IT industry 
association BITKOM (Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und 
neue Medien e.V.) in a statement, "but the regulation now presents an acceptable 
compromise between the legitimate interests of the state in surveillance of 
telecommunication and the Internet, on one side, and the technical and economic 
possibilities for the realization in practice on the other side."461 BITKOM was particularly 
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relieved that the compromise version does away with plans for the who lesale surveillance 
of service providers, and instead focuses on user network connections, which the group 
said lightens the load for smaller network providers and ISPs.462 But the privacy 
advocates were not easily pacified. Twelve human rights groups warned of the danger of 
a "surveillance state," citing the country's experiences with totalitarianism under the Nazi 
regime and East German communism.463 
 The privacy activists stated: "The balance between legally guaranteed citizen 
freedoms and the state's rights of encroachment must not -- as at present -- be abolished 
in the interest of abstract state security.”464 These activists include the Humanist Union, 
the German Association for Data Protection, and the hackers' group Chaos Computer 
Club.465 They were addressing not only the eavesdropping rule, but also other proposed 
security measures including fingerprinting, the release of student records to police, and 
increased surveillance of foreigners.466 
 
E. China. 
 There are limited rights to privacy in the Chinese Constitution, which are subject 
to broad exemptions for protecting state security. 467 China has a long-standing policy that 
keeps a close track of its citizens.468 According to expert W.J.F Jenner, “ The Chinese 
States by the fourth century BC at latest were often remarkably successful in keeping 
records of their whole populations so that they could be taxed and conscripted. The state 
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had the surname, personal name, age and home place of every subject and was also able 
to ensure that nobody could move far from home without proper authorization.”469   
In September 2001, the Chinese police set up a computer system along the Chinese 
railway network that allows officers to compare the faces of suspicious passers-by to an 
electronic database of mugshots.470 This was done ahead of a week- long holiday that 
began in October during which an estimated 64 million people were expected to be 
travelling across China.471 Now when passengers come into and depart from Beijing 
Station, they have to pass through numerous checkpoints.472 Anyone who acts or looks 
suspicious is taken to a computer terminal linked to a network of wanted law breakers.473 
At least four such terminals were installed in the plaza in front of Beijing Station. 474 
Suspects are lined up and compared to photographs and other information on thousands 
of wanted criminals from around China.475 
 Since 1984, all Chinese citizens over the age of 16 have been required to carry 
identification cards issued by the ministry of Public Security. 476 Identification cards 
include name, sex, nationality, date of birth, address and term of validity, of which there 
are three: between the ages of 16 and 25, it is 10 years, between the ages of 25-45, it is 20 
years and for those aged 45 and over it is permanent.477 In carrying out their duties, 
public security organs have the right to ask citizens to show their identity cards.478   
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 By mid-2003 all of Hong Kong's 6.8 million residents will be offered digital 
identity cards for use in secure online transactions when the authorities introduce a new 
“smart” nationa l identity card.479 This card will replace the existing national identity 
cards held by all Hong Kong residents for immigration and foreign travel purposes.480 
The new chip card is controversial because it will contain other applications in addition to 
identity details, raising privacy concerns.481 The card has embedded computer chips that 
hold names, pictures and birth dates as well as a digital template of both thumbprints.482  
 
F.  France. 
 While ECHELON has gained widespread notoriety, there is evidence that 
European countries are also carrying out international surveillance.483 France reportedly 
has developed its own "Frenchelon" which is a worldwide network of spy satellites and 
listening stations that systematically eavesdrop on communications in the United States 
and elsewhere.484 Monitoring stations are said to exist in French Guiana, in the city of 
Domme in the Dordogne region of southwestern France, in New Caledonia, and in the 
United Arab Emirates.485 
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 The information collected is reportedly used for both political and commercial 
ends.486 Additionally, some people speculate that the French project may mark the first 
step in a pan-European effort to counterbalance the U.S.'s global spying capabilities.487  
The French project is said to be run under the Direction Genéralé de la Sécurité 
Extérieure, an organization similar to the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and 
commercial information it generates is sent directly to the presidents of large French 
companies as well as government officials.488 The existence of French global 
surveillance, first publicized in June 1998 by Jean Guisnel of the French newsweekly Le 
Point, has not been officially confirmed or denied by the French government.489 The lack 
of a denial has caused observers to speculate that such a program may exist.490 
 Unlike the ECHELON project, which has been publicly documented by the U.K. 
based human rights organization, Omega Foundation, in a report for the European 
Parliament's Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) unit in January 
1998, there is no official evidence that France or any other European nation practices 
systematic surveillance of international civilian communications.491 
 However, a French official familiar with the France's system stated privately that 
such a program indeed exists, but at a "vastly smaller scale" than ECHELON.492 The 
person claimed that ECHELON intercepts around 3 million messages per minute, while 
the French system intercepts roughly 2 million messages per month. 493 
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CHAPTER 5 
FUTURE PRIVACY ISSUES 
 Privacy is a very complex and vexing issue.494 Solutions to the problem of privacy 
would be very easy to imagine but difficult to implement.495 As between many privacy 
issues the privacy issue dealing with biometrics is especially alarming.496 The biometric 
industry is booming and soon there will be a widespread adoption of biometric 
systems.497 If for example, one form of biometric systems such as fingerprinting were 
adopted, the various databases containing the digitized versions of the prints could be 
combined.498 While such a system is most likely to be developed by the commercial 
sector for use in financial transactions, the government would be likely to want to take 
advantage of these massive databases for other purposes, especially if a country were to 
enter a time of social unrest and instability.499  The widespread implementation of video 
surveillance is harmful for several reasons.500 We are growing more accustomed to video 
cameras watching our every movement.501 We will soon reach a time when these cameras 
will be considered part of the furniture and will loose track of our civil and fundamental 
rights.502 
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 In the new world of electronic commerce, an emphasis is being placed on the 
establishment of mechanisms for authenticating the identity of an individual who wishes 
to engage in a transaction. 503 In order for electronic commerce to move beyond simple 
online credit card purchases, and into more complex transactions involving contracts or 
financing, some form of ‘digital signature’ mechanism is a certain development.504 While 
such a signature would make new commercial transactions possible, it also raises 
significant privacy concerns, because if safeguards were not built into such a system, it 
would create permanent electronic tracks.505  
 The next emerging privacy issue would be the “smart card” proposals.506 In 
assuming consumers will continue to sacrifice privacy for convenience, the creation of a 
single card or number, that combines commercial and government transactions requiring 
authentication, is a likely possibility.507 There is increasingly rapid growth in wireless 
technologies.508 Digital cell-phones are becoming smaller, cheaper and have more 
sophisticated features.509 They can send and receive email messages, surf the internet and 
so on. The vision of many corporations and Internet start-ups is to be able to deliver 
location specific advertising to these cell phone devices.510 So, if you’re traveling through 
the city on a freeway, you might receive a message telling you that just off the next exit is 
a restaurant that serves your favorite food.511 Or as you walk past Starbucks, you’ll be 
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flashed a message offering you a special on double lattes.512 Cell phones must now be 
able to pinpoint the user’s location to the nearest 100 feet for emergency assistance 
purposes.513 If you are in a traffic accident, emergency vehicles can find you easily to 
administer assistance.514 Unfortunately the cost of these conveniences and personal safety 
measures is personal privacy. 515 Our cell phones will continue to remain location-tracking 
devices.516 
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CHAPTER 6 
REMEDIES 
 The Privacy Act of 1974517 attempted to strike a fragile balance between the 
government's need to gather and to use personal information and the individual's 
competing need to maintain control over such personal information. 518 In furtherance of 
these competing goals, the Privacy Act requires every federal agency maintaining a 
record on an individual within a system of records to: (1) permit the individual to control 
the use and dissemination of information contained in the record; (2) permit the 
individual to review, to correct, or to amend information contained in the record; (3) 
regulate and restrict the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information in 
the record; and (4) be subject to civil suit for specified violations of the Privacy Act.519 
Collectively, these safeguards are designed to protect individual privacy, while 
preserving the government's ability to gather and to use personal information. 520 
The Privacy Act of 1974 attempts to strike a balance between the government's need to 
gather and to use personal information and the individual's need to exercise control over 
that information. 521 The balance, however, has never been achieved.522 Instead, the 
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Privacy Act has favored the government's desire for information at the expense of 
individual privacy. 523  
 The best way to protect privacy is to give individuals the tools to do it 
themselves.524 There should be a watch over the government's tendency to sacrifice 
people's privacy for other goals and perform government wide reviews of new federal 
programs for privacy violations before they're launched.525 If the Government is 
implementing certain surveillance technologies, there should be notification of such 
surveillance to the citizens.526 
 Laws are needed that require improved computer security. 527 In 1970 Congress 
passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which gave Americans the previously denied right 
to see their own credit reports and demand the removal of erroneous information. 528 Elliot 
Richardson, who at the time was President Nixon's Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare, created a commission in 1972 to study the impact of computers on privacy. 529 
The most important contribution of the Richardson report was a bill of rights for the 
computer age, which was called the ‘Code of Fair Information Practices’.530 “The code is 
based on five principles: 
1. There must be no personal-data record-keeping system whose very existence is secret. 
2. There must be a way for a person to find out what information about the person is in a 
record and how it is used. 
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3. There must be a way for a person to prevent information about the person that was 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without 
the person's consent. 
4. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of identifiable 
information about the person. 
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of identifiable 
personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take 
precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 
 Privacy is one of our most cherished freedoms, and today it is being suppressed 
by technology. The shape of our future will depend on how we deal with the present 
issues. I think the main remedies for privacy violations would how we control or regulate 
this threat to our freedom as we face it today.”531 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
530 Id. 
531 Id 
 65 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 It is true that with the advancement in technology our society has become very 
interconnected and interdependent, making it difficult to have absolute privacy. But every 
society should also have its limits. Police technology invading our privacy rights would 
also have a detrimental effect on the mental health of a person. 532 It would increase the 
amount of stress in our lives, and we would be less free to disclose personal information 
in interpersonal relationships.533 Computer profiling in the case of the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network534 could raise equal protection issues.535 FinCen searches use 
variables such as race, religion, gender and national origin.536 The system might identify 
people as suspects on the basis of their names or surnames or national origin. 537  
 But a major issue, which would justify the government in resorting to these 
measures, would be to combat the problem of terrorism. Terrorism had been employed 
for centuries as a means of forcing change through heightened diplomatic pressure and 
politically consequential violence without having to bear any responsibility.538 Terrorism 
creates fear and thus undermines the confidence of society. 539 Essentially terrorism has 
three effects: An immediate effect of killing or injuring those who are deemed a 
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prohibited target; an intermediate effect of intimidating the larger population therefore 
influencing their political behavior; and an aggregate effect of undermining overall public 
order.540 With the recent terrorist attacks on the United States and around the world, the 
government is justified in enforcing new measures in order to ensure our safety. In my 
country, India, terrorism has been a problem for years and if I had a choice to chose 
between my privacy on one hand and my safety on the other, without hesitation, I would 
choose the latter. But at the same time there has to be a balance struck somewhere in the 
middle.541 We need to protect our privacy and also support law enforcement by utilizing 
new technologies specifically designed to keep our countries safe from thieves, criminals 
and terrorists.542  
 Ever since I became interested in the issue of privacy, I always remember the 
novel ‘1984’ written by George Orwell.543 In his novel, Orwell envisioned that by the 
year 1984, a totalitarian government would rule the world. In his novel, he described a 
society where there were cameras in people’s homes and in their work places. The 
surveillance was so powerful to the extent that the government controlled people’s 
thoughts. People were constricted in their acts and could not lead a normal healthy life. 
There was a famous caption that was used repeatedly throughout the novel: “BIG 
BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU”. Big Brother signifies the government. The 
totalitarian world envisioned by Orwell never became a reality, but in essence he is trying 
to let people know that they should be aware of what is going on around them. We have 
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certain fundamental rights, which are very precious to us, and I think these rights should 
never be taken away.  
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